Hargesia, Somaliland: On November 13th, Somaliland heads to polls for presidential and party elections. Somaliland, a self-declared republic that broke away from Somalia, is set to hold its presidential and party elections on Wednesday, marking the fourth consecutive electoral cycle since 2003. Initially scheduled for November 13, 2022, these elections were postponed after Somaliland’s House of Elders extended President Muse Bihi’s mandate by two years, a move that sparked criticism from opposition leaders, who described it as a “win-win situation.”
Since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has held various elections, including local council, parliamentary, and presidential races, yet it still lacks international recognition. The first multiparty elections in 2003, followed by others in 2010 and 2017, demonstrated Somaliland’s commitment to democratic processes, although disputes and accusations of fraud have arisen occasionally. These elections have fostered a relatively stable political environment in Somaliland, separate from Somalia, though the lack of recognition remains a significant barrier, impacting economic opportunities and diplomatic relations.
With the 2024 elections approaching, Somaliland’s quest for international recognition has intensified amid rising tensions in the Horn of Africa. Hargeisa’s pursuit of recognition has frustrated Mogadishu, which still claims Somaliland as part of its territory, raising the stakes for regional diplomacy. NATO’s interest in establishing a base in Somaliland underscores the region’s strategic importance for security and stability. This election is a pivotal moment not only for local dynamics but also for the broader geopolitical landscape.
SOMALILAND 2024 ELECTIONS
The 2024 presidential race will feature familiar faces. The ruling Kulmiye Party has once again nominated President Muse Bihi for a second term. In the 2017 election, he ran with Abdirahman Saylici, but this time he has chosen Mohamoud Hassan Saajin, the Minister of Commerce, as his running mate.
The opposition Waddani Party has nominated former long-time parliament speaker Abdirahman Mohamed Cirro, alongside Mohamed Ali Abdi. In 2017, Cirro received 40.73% of the vote. For this election, Waddani has formed a coalition with the newly established KAAH political association, led by former Aviation and Presidency Minister Mohamud Hashi Abdi.
The UCID party’s leader, Faisal Ali Warabe, who has lost the last three elections, is running for president for the fourth time. An engineer by profession, Warabe founded UCID in 2001 but garnered less than 5% of the vote in 2017.
Aside from the presidential election, Somaliland’s party elections will determine the three national parties eligible for the next decade. Kulmiye, Waddani, and UCID will compete against seven political associations—Barwaaqo, Rejo, Horseed, KAAH, Talo-Wadaag, Hillaac, and Shacabka—seeking national party status.
SOMALILAND-ETHIOPIA DEAL VS SOMALIA
In January 2024, Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Addis Ababa, granting Ethiopia sea access in exchange for support for Somaliland’s recognition. Somalia’s federal government rejected the deal, deeming it illegal and accusing Ethiopia of undermining Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Ethiopia, which lost its sea access in 1993 following Eritrea’s independence, would gain access to Somaliland’s Gulf of Aden coastline, leasing about 20 kilometers for 50 years to establish naval and commercial bases. In return, Ethiopia has hinted at potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence.
Somalia’s government strongly rejected the MoU, recalling its ambassador in Addis Ababa and ordering the closure of two Ethiopian consulates in Puntland and Somaliland. Both Somaliland and Puntland dismissed the closures, with Somaliland calling it “daydreaming.” Additionally, Somalia expelled Ethiopia’s ambassador in Mogadishu, Muktar Mohamed Ware, ordering him to leave the country within 72 hours.
Amid these tensions, Somaliland appointed a new ambassador, Aadan Geedi Qayaad, to Ethiopia and welcomed Ethiopia’s new consul to Somaliland, Teshome Shunde, at the presidential palace.
SOMALIA-SOMALILAND ISSUE
Efforts to reconcile differences between Somalia and Somaliland have faced numerous setbacks since talks began in 2012. President Hassan of Somalia and Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi met in Djibouti to resume these discussions, but progress has been slow due to conflicting goals: Mogadishu aims for national unity, while Hargeisa seeks independence.
Both Muse Bihi and Abdirahman Cirro have expressed a willingness to continue discussions, although frustration with the slow pace is evident. UCID Party candidate Faisal Ali Warabe has stated he would end the talks altogether, considering them ineffective and flawed.
Regional analyst Abdinasser Ahmed suggests that Somaliland’s election results are unlikely to renew efforts toward reconciliation with Somalia, as the incoming president will likely focus on unilateral recognition efforts and strategic lobbying with international partners, including the United States and implementing the MoU with Ethiopia.
“For more than decade, attempts at dialogue have failed to advance Somaliland’s case. The newly elected president is determined to pursue unilateral recognition and will prioritize implementing the MoU with Ethiopia.”
Lawyer and activist Guleid Ahmed Jama states that resuming talks between Mogadishu and Hargeisa will not be a priority for Somaliland, adding that “Mogadishu is also preoccupied with election disputes.”
IMPACT ON THE HORN OF AFRICA
The Somaliland elections carry significant implications for the already tense Horn of Africa. Egypt’s support for Somalia’s federal government, including weapons deliveries, is seen as countering Ethiopian influence, especially given Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland. This Egyptian support could increase the risk of military escalation in the region.
In Ethiopia, the elections in Somaliland add complexity to its regional strategy, particularly its port access deals and broader diplomatic goals. Addis Ababa’s partnership with Hargeisa, including the use of the Berbera port, is essential for Ethiopian trade and strategic positioning. Somaliland’s stability and potential international recognition are critical for implementing the MoU.
Regional analyst Abdinasser Ahmed believes Somaliland’s election outcome could shape the region’s dynamics, particularly through Somaliland’s diplomatic relations with Ethiopia and Somalia and its influence in Red Sea conflicts.
“The Somaliland election is crucial for ensuring stability in the region. It will decisively mark the end of political instability in the country and significantly impact the rapidly shifting geopolitics in the region. The newly elected president will have the authority to define Somaliland’s approach to important issues, including relationships with Ethiopia, Somalia, and ongoing conflicts in the Red Sea.”
Lawyer and activist Guleid Dafac believes these elections will bring political stability and positively impact both Somaliland and the Horn of Africa. “The elections will introduce political stability in Somaliland, positively impacting the region,” he says.
Former Somalia Foreign State Minister Balal M. Osman warns that Ethiopia’s MoU with Somaliland could heighten tensions, not only with Somalia but also among other regional stakeholders. “The illegal agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia, if pursued, holds significant implications for the region’s peace and security. Recognizing Somaliland as an independent entity would diverge from the longstanding African and international consensus upholding sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
He argues that Ethiopia’s unilateral engagement with Somaliland could embolden separatist sentiments and complicate diplomatic relations, potentially sparking new conflicts in the region. “Such a move could provoke tensions not only with Somalia but also among other regional stakeholders who are invested in maintaining stability and a united front in the Horn of Africa.”
Balal urges Ethiopia to seek sea access respectfully, suggesting it requests access in accordance with international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
“Alternatively, if Ethiopia’s main concern is securing sea access, a more constructive approach would be to respect Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, then formally request access under international laws like UNCLOS. By engaging in transparent dialogue, Ethiopia could seek a mutually beneficial arrangement that respects Somalia’s territorial unity while addressing its economic needs.”
INTERNAL CHALLENGES
Within Somaliland, challenges persist. In 2023, local militias in the Sool region reclaimed control from Somaliland authorities, forming the SSC-Khaatumo Interim Administration. Meanwhile, a Sanaag region-based political committee linked with the federal government seeks recognition as an interim administration, aiming for independence from both Somaliland and Puntland State.
In sum, Somaliland’s 2024 election is not merely a local event—it holds major implications for the Horn of Africa’s stability and Somaliland’s quest for international recognition. The outcome will shape Somaliland’s diplomatic relations and impact regional security dynamics at a critical time in East African politics.
